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Abstract 
Operators of critical interactive systems are trained and 
qualified before being allowed to operate critical systems in 
“real” contexts. However, during operation, things might 
happen differently from during training sessions as system 
failures may occur and operators may make errors when 
interacting with the system. Both events may also be cross-
related as a misunderstanding of a system failure can lead to 
an erroneous subsequent operation.  
The proposed approach focuses on assessing the impact that 
potential failures and/or human errors may have on human 
performance. This analysis targets the design and 
development phases of the system, when user tasks are 
analyzed in order to build the right system (i.e. 
corresponding to the users’ needs and activities they have to 
perform on the system). We use a task modeling notation for 
describing precisely operators’ activities as well as 
information, knowledge and objects required for performing 
these activities. These task models are then augmented into 
several variants through integration of potential system 
failure patterns (with associated recovery tasks) and human 
error patterns. The produced deviated task models are used 
to assess the impact of the task deviation on the operators’ 
performance.  
Introduction 
Design and development of interactive critical systems 
require methods to account for their dependability. Several 
aspects of dependability have to be addressed: 
dependability of the system, dependability of the user and 
dependability of the interaction between the system and the 
user. In this paper we focus on management of system 
failures and human error at runtime. Even if systems have 
been designed and developed with dependability in mind, 
failures may occur. Even if operators are trained before 
being allowed to operate critical systems, they may make 
errors when interacting with the system. We propose a 
notation and associated CASE tool to provide support for 
analysis of the impact of system failures and human error 
on human performance. First section presents an overview 
of classifications of system failures and human errors. 
Second section presents the proposed task modeling 
notation used to describe human activities and potential 
human errors that may be made during the planned 
activities. Last section discusses about how these task 
models can be used to assess the impact of failures and 
human errors on human activities and on the system. The 
proposed approach is exemplified all along the sections 
with a case study from the space satellite ground segments 
domain. This case study belongs to the category of 
complex command and control systems from the space 
domain. Such interactive systems are less time constrained 
than other ones (such as aircraft cockpits). These systems 
are less safety critical (the only possible safety issue would 
correspond to a spacecraft falling on earth and injuring 
people). However, the potential cost of a failure is far 
beyond the development cost of these systems making 
them belong to the category of critical systems.  
This paper first reviews how system failures and human 
errors can be taken into account. Second part is dedicated 
to task modeling and integration of human errors in task 
models. Last part describes how the deviated task models 
can be used to assess the impact of failure or human errors 
on human activities and system in the context of a satellite 
ground segment. 
Accounting for System Failures and Human 
Errors 
In the area of dependable systems such issues have been 
looked at and current state of the art in the field identifies 
five different ways to increase a system’s reliability 
(Avizienis et al., 2004) and (Bowen and Stavridou, 1993): 
• Fault avoidance: preventing the occurrence of faults by
construction (usually by using formal description
techniques and proving safety and liveness properties
(Pnueli, 1986)).
• Fault removal: reducing the number of faults that can
occur (by verification of properties).
• Fault forecasting: estimating the number, future
incidence and likely consequences of faults (usually by
statistical evaluation of the occurrence and consequences 
of faults). 
• Fault tolerance: avoiding service failure in the presence
of faults (usually by adding redundancy, multiple
versions and voting mechanisms).
• Fault mitigation: reducing the severity of faults (by
adding barriers or healing behaviors (Neema et al.,
2004)). 
Fault avoidance can be attained by the formal specification 
of the interactive system behavior provided all the aspects 
of interactive systems are accounted for including device 
drivers’ behaviors, graphical rendering and events handling 
and a Petri net based approach dealing with these aspects 
can be found here (Navarre et al., 2009). 
However, due to this software/hardware integration faults 
might occur at runtime regardless the effort deployed 
during design phases. To increase the system reliability 
concerning runtime faults, we have previously proposed 
(Tankeu-Choitat et al., 2011) ways to address both fault 
tolerance and fault mitigation for safety critical interactive 
systems, while fault recovery was addressed through 
interaction reconfiguration as described in (Navarre et al., 
2008). While fault tolerance and fault mitigation can be 
seen as rather different they require the deployment of the 
same underlying mechanisms:  
• Fault detection: identifying the presence of faults, the
type of the fault and possibly its source,
• Fault recovery: transforming the system state that
contains one or more faults into a state without fault.
Of course, the training program must deal with these 
adverse events and prepare the user to be able to deal with 
them in a dependable and timely manner. However, as 
aforementioned some autonomous mechanisms can be 
defined and deployed leaving most of the faults un-notified 
to the operator. However, the operator may also make 
errors. 
Figure 1. Overview of Human Errors 
Several taxonomies of human errors have been proposed 
(Reason, 1990; Hollnagel, 1998) and Figure 1 depicts a 
summary of these errors. In order to mitigate human errors, 
several actions can be taken: 
• Error detection or notice: identifying the presence of
errors, the type of the error and possibly its root cause.
One of the key elements here is to detect errors even
though they have no impact on operations as this might
be due to contingencies that might lead to incidents or 
accidents in another context.  
• Error prevention: reducing the potential number of
occurrences by designing adequate training, designing
affording products and designing usable system
• Error protection: reducing the impact of an error by
including barriers in the design and duplicating
operators.
While the same applies to human error and system failures 
current methods, techniques and tools address them 
independently and promote different treatment. 
Next section presents how these failures and errors can be 
described when analyzing user activities during system 
design proposing a unified process for both. 
Modeling Operator Tasks with Having System 
Failures and Human Errors in Mind 
Task models are a mean to gather and structure data from 
the analysis of users’ activities. They aim at recording, 
refining and analyzing information about users’ activities. 
Several notations are available and provide various formats 
to describe tasks and having various expressiveness levels 
depending on targeted analysis, one of the most famous 
being CTT (Mori et al. 2002). This section briefly 
introduces HAMSTERS, the task modeling notation and its 
associated CASE tool used for assessing impact of system 
failures and human errors on human performance.  
HAMSTERS Notation and Tool 
HAMSTERS is a tool-supported graphical task modeling 
notation aiming at representing human activities in a 
hierarchical and ordered way. Goals can be decomposed 
into sub-goals, which can in turn be decomposed into 
activities. Output of this decomposition is a graphical tree 
of nodes. Nodes can be tasks or temporal operators.  
Figure 2. High-level Task Types in HAMSTERS 
Tasks can be of several types (as illustrated in Figure 2) 
and contain information such as a name, information 
details, critical level… Only the high-level task type are 
presented here (due to space constraints) but they are 
further refined (for instance the cognitive tasks can be 
refined in Analysis and Decision tasks (Martinie, Palanque, 
Ragosta, Barboni, 2011). 
Temporal operators are used to represent temporal 
relationships between sub-goals and between activities (as 
detailed in Table 1). Tasks can also be tagged by temporal 
properties to indicate whether or not they are iterative, 
optional or both. Composition and structuration 
mechanisms provide support for description of large 
amounts of activities (Martinie, Palanque, Winckler, 2011). 
Table 1. Temporal Ordering Operators in 
HAMSTERS 
Operator type Symbol Description 
Enable T1>>T2 T2 is executed after T1 
Concurrent T1|||T2 T1 and T2 are executed at the same time 
Choice T1[]T2 T1 is executed OR T2 is executed 




Execution of T2 interrupts the execution of T1, T1 
execution is resumed after T2  
Order 
Independent 
T1|=|T2 T1 is executed then T2 OR T2 is executed then T1 
Explicit and systematic integration of object, 
information and knowledge provides support for 
description of required objects, information, declarative 
knowledge and procedural knowledge required to 
accomplish the tasks (Martinie et al., 2013). 
Figure 3. Representation of Objects, Information and 
Knowledge with HAMSTERS Notation 
Figure 3 presents the notation elements for objects, input 
and output device objects, information used by users to 
perform the tasks, and knowledge required to perform the 
tasks. Figure 4 shows an extract (high level tasks) of the 
HAMSTERS task model of PICARD satellite platform 
management. Refined models that include low-level 
routine activities (such as the ones depicted in Figure 6) are 
not included here due to space constraints.  
Modeling Failure Detection and Recovery 
Once planned activities have been described, we propose to 
build task models for failure and detection recovery 
activities that may take place after a system failure. In this 
way, it is possible to ensure that the interactive system 
provide support for this type of activities but also to en sure 
that the operators will be trained (Martinie et al., 2011) for 
this type of adverse events. A new version of the high level 
task model has been produced (presented in Figure 4). A 
“Failure detection and recovery” branch has been added 
(“Detect and recover from failure” sub-goal concurrent to 
the “Monitor satellite parameters” and “Handle routine 
activities” sub-goals). This “Failure detection and 
recovery” sub-goal has then been refined in several task 
models to describe the activities that the user may have to 
lead depending of the various types of failures that may 
occur. For the rest of the paper, we will take the example 
of a failing Sun Array Driver Assembly (SADA). If this 
appliance fails, operators have to detect it and try to switch 
ON the redundant SADA.  
An excerpt of this activity is depicted in Figure 5.a). The 
operator has to select and launch a procedure through the 
ground segment application (interactive input tasks “Select 
procedure Switch ON SADA2” and “Start procedure 
“Switch ON SADA2”).Operator has then to wait for the 
system to trigger the rotation of the redundant SADA and 
wait for a message from the system asking if the rotation 
has to be stopped (interactive output task “Display rotation 
stop message”). 
Figure 4. HAMSTERS Task Model of PICARD Satellite Platform Management (High Level Tasks) 
Figure 5. HAMSTERS Task Model of PICARD Satellite Platform Management (Including Failures) 
a)                     b)
Figure 6. Task Model of “Switch ON SADA2” Procedure a) without Human Error b) with Human Error 
Modeling Human Error 
Operators have then to check parameters in order to 
identify the current position (human perceptive task 
“Perceive position” which output the information “current 
position”) of the SADA2 and whether or not it is compliant 
to the targeted position (human cognitive analysis tasks 
“Analyze that SADA2 position is set correctly” and 
“Analyze that SADA2 position is not set correctly” which 
need “current position” and “targeted position” as inputs). 
Once operators have made a decision (human cognitive 
decision tasks “Decide to…”), they press the 
corresponding button on the user interface associated with 
the interactive input tasks “Press YES” and “Press NO”. 
Human errors can then be integrated into the tasks models 
for ensuring system robustness. In that perspective, 
erroneous behavior described in task models can be used to 
evaluate the impact of a human error on the system as 
proposed by (Bass and Bolton, 2013). Also in that 
perspective, mutant task specifications can be used to 
analyze the ability of the system to remain safe if a user 
performs deviated tasks on the system (Yasmeen and 
Gunter, 2011). Human errors can also be integrated into 
task models in order evaluate the usability of the system 
(Paterno and Santoro, 2002) and to inform design. In 
current paper, we focus on human performance and on task 
recovery whether the deviated task is performed upon 
system failure and/or upon human error. We propose to 
extend the work done by (Palanque & Basnyat, 2004) who 
proposed a Task Analysis for Error Identification 
technique. This technique can be used to identify potential 
human errors during routine activities as well as during 
failure detection and recovery activities. In this example, 
we focus on one type of error but an example of a complete 
case study of task analysis for error identification can be 
found in (Palanque & Basnyat, 2004). However, in that 
earlier work, information, devices and objects required to 
perform a task were not represented in the task models. 
Thus, it did not provide support to assess performance at 
the information level. This made impossible to reason 
about workload aspect of operator performance. In our 
presented case study, human errors can occur while 
accomplishing the procedure to setup the redundant Sun 
Array Driver Assembly. For example, Figure 5 b) presents 
the task model of erroneous actions performed by the 
operator in that case. From Reason’s classification, an 
associative-activation error (Reason, 1990) can occur if an 
operator clicks on “YES” while s/he had decided not to 
confirm stop or if s/he clicks on “NO” while s/he had 
decided to confirm stop. This error implies that the 
operators will have additional tasks to perform in order to 
reach the goal of switching to the redundant SADA. These 
additional tasks are presented in detail in Figure 6. 
Operators will have to understand that the rotation did not 
stop in spite of the fact he/she wanted it to stop (cognitive 
analysis task “Analyze the rotation did not stop” in Figure 
6). They will then have to wait for the SADA2 position to 
become correct and for the next confirmation message in 
order to be able to terminate the procedure.  
Assessment of the Impact of Failures or 
Human Errors on Human Performance 
Task models of failure detection and recovery as well as 
task models integrating potential human errors and their 
impact on the operators’ activities provide support for 
establishing requirements on the future system but also for 
evaluating the impact of failures and errors on the global 
human performance and on the mission execution. In our 
example, we can see that in the case of a human error while 
switching to the redundant SADA: 
• At least 9 more activities will have to be performed. As
“Monitor position task” is iterative (round shaped arrow
on the left side of the task widget), operators might have
to examine several times the position before it becomes
correct.
• Operators will have to cognitively handle more
information and during a longer period of time (“current
position” and “targeted position” information objects in
Figure 5.b)) than without the interference error.
In this example, given the decision to switch on the 
redundant SADA, the satellite is maybe currently in a low 
Figure 4. Zoom on Tasks Inserted for Error and Recovery from Error (from Figure 3)b)) 
power state (survival mode). This means that energy has to 
be spared and redundant SADA set as soon as possible. 
This analysis highlights that a human error during this 
recovery task could be fatal for the mission. 
Conclusion 
The proposed approach combining operators’ tasks 
modeling with operators’ errors information provides 
support for assessment of the articulatory activities the 
operators will have to perform in order to recover from 
system failure. This can be applied to routine activities, 
failure detection and recovery activities or human error 
detection and recovery activities. By making explicit the 
tasks, the information and the objects that have to be 
handled by the operators, this approach enables assessing 
the recovery cost from a system failure (i.e. to set the 
system in an acceptable state) but also from a human error 
i.e. performing a set of corrective actions in order to, as for 
a system failure, set the system to an acceptable state. 
This short presentation of the approach has not made it 
possible to exemplify a set of other benefits that become 
reachable using such task models enhanced with human 
error descriptions. For instance: 
• Some of the information explicitly represented in the
task model might correspond to information that has to
be stored in the operator’s working memory (e.g. a flight
level clearance received by a pilot from an air traffic
controller). The modeling approach would make explicit
how much time (quantitative) but also how many actions
have to be performed while keeping in mind such
information.
• The tasks and the related information might be located
on specific devices. This is not the case for a space
ground where monitoring is co-located with
telecommands triggering, but the possibility to represent
that information in HAMSTERS enables to assess low-
level complexity of tasks such as device localization,
moving attention and activity from one device to another
one…
The presented analysis is performed informally and 
manually but HAMSTERS models edition and simulation 
are supported by the eponym tool. Performance analysis 
functionalities are currently being integrated exploiting 
contributions previously made for synergistic system-task 
execution (Barboni et al., 2011) and training program 
assessment (Martinie et al., 2011). 
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